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In 2006, Georgia began a two-year transition to a 
single-factor apportionment formula for corporate 
income of multistate firms.  Firms with income from 
multistate operations determine the portion of their 
total corporate tax base that is associated with each 
state based on that state’s apportionment formula.  For 
the years between 1995 and 2006, firms operating in 
Georgia and other states applied an apportionment 
formula consisting of a 50 percent weight on sales and 
a 25 percent weight each on property and payroll.  
Prior to 1995, Georgia firms with multistate income 
applied an equally weighted apportionment formula to 
their corporate earnings.  Georgia joins ten other 
states that by 2008 have adopted a sales-only 
apportionment formula for multistate corporate 
income, i.e. a 100 percent weight on sales and a zero 
weight on property and payroll. 
The purpose of this brief is to identify the number and 
characteristics of corporations that are expected to 
benefit from the switch to a single-factor 
apportionment formula and the number and 
characteristics of those that are not.  While the overall 
effect of the apportionment formula change was 
estimated to reduce state revenues from the corporate 
income tax, not all firms will face lower corporate tax 
liabilities  as  a  result of this change.  A firm will benefit  
or lose depending on the values of its payroll, 
property, and sales in Georgia relative to its national 
payroll, property, and sales and on the value of any tax 
credits and losses it may have.  For the purposes of 
this brief, we define a benefit as a reduction in a firm’s 
apportionment ratio, which may for some firms lead 
to a decrease in Georgia tax liability.  In addition to 
considering changes in apportionment ratios, we also 
consider a broader standard, one in which we define 
the benefit as a reduction in the firm’s Georgia tax 
liability. 
Apportionment Formula and Corporate Tax 
Liability 
While the Georgia state corporate tax base closely 
follows the federal corporate tax base,1 not all of a 
firm’s federal tax base may be subject to tax by the 
state of Georgia.  Those firms which operate in 
several states apportion their total net business 
income across all states in which they have nexus in 
order to determine how much of their total tax base 
is associated with operations in each state.2  Firms that 
operate exclusively within Georgia are not required to 
apportion their income and therefore their tax 
liabilities are unaffected by any change to the 
apportionment formula.   
 
 
 The amount of a firm’s corporate income apportioned to each 
state is determined by that state’s apportionment formula.  In 
general, the firm’s corporate apportionment ratio (determined 
by the state corporate apportionment formula) is multiplied 
by the firm’s net business income to determine the percent of 
the firm’s total income that is subject to tax by a given state.  
The higher the firm’s apportionment ratio, the greater the 
firm’s potential state tax liability.3  The apportionment formula 
used in Georgia between 1995 and 2006 is expressed in 
Equation 1 and is referred to as a double-weighted three-
factor apportionment formula because it is based on the 
three-factors of labor, property, and sales, and has a double 
weight on sales.  This is denoted by the 50 percent weight on 
the ratio of Georgia sales to national sales compared to only a 
25 percent weight for either the payroll or property fraction.  
Prior to 1995, the Georgia apportionment formula had a 
33.33 percent weight on all factors.  Equation 2 represents the 
single-factor apportionment formula which is dependent only 
on the value of sales receipts within the state.  This became 
the Georgia apportionment formula in 2008.  In 2008, 11 
eleven states used a sales only apportionment formula.  The 
majority of the remaining states used a three-factor formula, 
many with a double- or greater weight on sales.   
3-Factor Apportionment Ratio = 25%ሺܮீ஺/ܮ௎ௌሻ ൅
25%ሺܲீ ஺/ ௎ܲௌሻ ൅ 50%ሺܵீ஺/ܵ௎ௌሻ.  (Eq. 1) 
Single-factor Apportionment Ratio = 100%ሺܵீ஺/ܵ௎ௌሻ.  (Eq. 2) 
where LGA = value of property in Georgia held by the firm; 
LUS = value of property everywhere held by the firm; 
PGA = value of compensation paid to workers in Georgia by 
the firm; 
PUS = value of compensation paid everywhere by the firm; 
SGA = value of sales to customers in Georgia; 
SUS = value of sales everywhere by the firm. 
 
For some firms, moving from the apportionment formula 
shown in equation 1 to the apportionment formula shown in 
equation 2 will produce an unambiguous gain.  For instance, 
those firms that have no sales presence in Georgia will see 
their apportionment ratio reduced to zero.  On the other 
hand, firms with only a sales presence but no labor or 
property, will see their apportionment ratio rise from 50 
percent before the change to 100 percent.  Non-apportioning 
firms will see no change.  The effect on firms with some 
presence in terms of property, payroll, and receipts is more 
ambiguous and clarified with the analysis presented later in 
this brief.   
 
 
 
 
Apportionment Changes and Economic Development 
As shown in equation 1, under the three-factor apportionment 
formula, the apportionment ratio increases in value as the value of 
a firm’s employment and facilities within the state increase.  With 
a three-factor formula, firms that increase their employment or 
property holdings in a state increase the value of their 
apportionment ratio and face a potentially higher tax liability.  
Because of this, the three-factor formula has been viewed as an 
excise tax on labor and property (McLure, 1980) as it creates a 
disincentive for firms to expand facilities and/or employment in 
the state.  When considered in this light, the move to a single-
factor apportionment formula is viewed as the removal of a 
disincentive to increase employment and expand production in a 
state.  
On the other hand, a sales-only apportionment formula is seen as 
a violation of the general equity principle and of the benefits 
received principle.  Under a sales-only apportionment formula, 
firms with production operations in Georgia but with no Georgia-
based sales apportion no corporate income to Georgia while 
firms with similar level of sales to Georgia customers do 
apportion corporate income to the state.  Consider the example 
of Firm A with $1,000,000 in sales to customers in Georgia and 
payroll and property within the state of $1,000,000 each.  Assume 
Firm A has a profit of $100,000.  Under the sales-only 
apportionment formula, the tax liability for Firm A is 6 percent 
(which is the Georgia corporate income tax rate) of $100,000 or 
$6,000.  Compare this to Firm B with $1,000,000 of sales to 
customers in Alabama and no sales in Georgia but with payroll 
and property within Georgia of $1,000,000.  Assume Firm B also 
has a profit of $100,000.  Under the sales-only apportionment 
formula, the tax liability for Firm B is $0 since it has no Georgia-
based sales. Yet because the two firms obtain similar benefits 
from the state, an inequity is created between Firms A and B with 
regard to their state tax burden.   
In addition, the single-apportionment formula further weakens the 
tenuous link between the value of a firm’s corporate tax liability 
and the value of benefits it receives from the state.  According to 
benefits received principle, governments provide public services 
that are of value to firms and firms should be taxed according to 
the value of the benefits they receive.  For instance, companies 
benefit from transportation, the court system, and education 
expenditures provided by the state, among other services.  With a 
sales-only apportionment formula, the tax liability is based only on 
the value of Georgia sales, without regard for the value placed on 
the services provided by the government.  While this principle is 
also violated under the more traditional form of the corporate 
income tax, such as that using the double-weighted three-factor 
apportionment  formula,  a tax liability dependent on the presence  
 of employment and property in a state provides a stronger tie 
between the taxes paid and benefits received.4   
Empirical Evidence 
There have been several studies on the effects of the choice of 
corporate apportionment factors and their bearing on the 
employment and economic growth in a state.  Goolsbee and 
Maydew (2000) find that the payroll factor is a significant 
determinant in the level of manufacturing employment in the 
state.  Based on their analysis, moving from an equally-
weighted formula to a double-weighted formula would on 
average increase state manufacturing employment by 1.1 
percent.  Evidence from Gupta and Hofmann (2003) support 
the premise that capital investment in a state is significantly 
and negatively related to the weight placed on the property 
factor.   
On the other hand, the advantage of single-factor 
apportionment comes from the opportunity for the firm to 
allocate operations between states so as to minimize their 
overall tax liability (Mazerov, 2005).  If all states had a single-
factor formula, the advantage experienced by any one state 
would be greatly diminished.  Edmiston (2002) simulates the 
effect of all states moving simultaneously to a single-factor 
apportionment formula.  The author finds that once all states 
adopt the formula, the gains, in terms of increased 
employment and capital infrastructure, are greatly reduced 
and even result in an overall loss for some states.  That is, 
while any one state benefits from the move to a reduced 
weight on payroll and property when other states keep the 
equally-weighted formula, the size of the resulting effect in 
terms of increased employment and investment is dependent 
on the apportionment strategy of their neighbors.  Goolsbee 
and Maydew, while finding positive effects for a single state 
moving from an equally-weighted three-factor formula to a 
formula with a reduced weight on payroll, also find that 
nationally the effect tends to zero.  This implies that while 
there are gains in employment for some states, they come at 
the expense of employment losses in other states.    
Georgia Corporate Data and Simulation 
In 2005, 35 percent of Georgia corporate tax filers 
apportioned their corporate income, as shown in Table 1.  
The remaining firms earned all their income from operations 
within the state and did not apportion their income on the 
corporate return.  Compared to the population of corporate 
filers as a whole, apportioning firms are larger in terms of the 
value of their net worth and have a higher tax liability on 
average than nonapportioning firms.   
 
 
To assess the impact of changing the state apportionment formula 
on the apportionment ratio of firms, we compute the 
apportionment ratio for each firm in the Georgia Department of 
Revenue Master Corporate file under a sales-only apportionment 
formula using the 2005 corporate returns.5  We also compute the 
three-factor ratio for each apportioning firm in the dataset in 
order to assure the reliability of the data and for purposes of 
consistency.  For the large majority of our observations, the 
simulated three-factor ratio matched the reported three-factor 
ratio.  The simulated single-factor apportionment ratio is then 
compared to the three-factor double sales-weighted formula in 
use in 2005.  Those firms for which the switch to a single-factor 
apportionment formula results in a reduction in the 
apportionment ratio are designated as winning firms, while those 
for which the single-factor formula switch results in a higher 
apportionment ratio are designated as losing firms.   
Another obvious classification is to classify winning firms as those 
for which the switch results in a lower tax liability.  Since many 
firms face a zero tax liability under either apportionment formula 
(single or three-factor) due to tax credits, operating losses or 
carryforwards, fewer firms are classified as winning or losing firms 
under this classification scheme.  For this reason, we use the 
change in the value of the apportionment ratio as the benchmark 
by which we judge the effects of the change in the apportionment 
formula.  Later tables present the revenue implications of the 
apportionment formula change, which are dependent on the value 
of the change in tax liability resulting from the switch in 
apportionment formulas. 
Effect of Change in Apportionment Formula  
Based on our simulated apportionment ratios for the 2005 pool of 
corporate returns with apportioning income presented in Table 2, 
9,554 returns or 33 percent experienced a reduction in their 
apportionment ratio by an average of 49 percent.  At the same 
time, 13,024 or 45 percent of firms experienced an increase in 
their apportionment ratio of 52 percent on average.  In addition 
to the nonapportioning firms, figures in column 3 include 4,544 
apportioning firms that experienced no change in their 
apportionment ratio because they reported no national property 
or national employment but had positive receipts nationally and in 
Georgia.  As such, the current apportionment formula for these 
firms was already reduced to a single-factor formula and the 
apportionment change had no effect.6 
Data presented in Table 3 indicates that winning firms have 
significantly higher net worth than losing firms.   This is not an 
unexpected finding.  A greater Georgia net worth value is 
synonymous with larger property holdings, which are included in 
the three-factor apportionment formula but not in the single-
factor  formula.   Therefore,  those  firms  with  larger  values  for
  
TABLE 1. APPORTIONING AND NONAPPORTIONING FIRMS, 2005 
 All Firms Apportioning Firms Nonapportioning Firms 
Number of Filers 82,088 28,731 53,357 
Average Georgia Net Worth $5,892,209 $7,392,633 $5,084,279 
Average Georgia  
Tax Liability 
 
$7,433 
 
$17,078 
 
$2,239 
% with Positive Tax Liability 35% 40% 32% 
Average Georgia 
Apportionment Ratio 
 
0.69 
 
0.12 
 
1.0 
Source: Author’s calculation from Georgia Department of Revenue (2005). 
 
 
TABLE 2. FIRMS WITH CHANGE IN APPORTIONMENT RATIO 
 
 
 
All Corporate Filers 
 
Firms w/ an 
Apportionment Ratio 
Reduction 
 
Firms w/ an 
Apportionment Ratio 
Increase 
Firms w/ No Change 
in the  
Apportionment 
Ratio  
Number 9,554 13,024 57,901 
Average Percent Change in 
Apportionment Ratio 
 
-49% 
 
52% 
 
0% 
Source: Author’s calculation from Georgia Department of Revenue (2005). 
 
TABLE 3. CHARACTERISTICS OF WINNING AND LOSING FIRMS, 2005 
 
 
Average Value for Firms w/ an 
Apportionment Ratio Reduction 
Average Value for Firms w/ an 
Apportionment Ratio Increase 
Georgia Net Worth $14,982,280 $3,907,584 
Georgia Tax Liability $30,692 $14,372 
Georgia Receipts $23,058,647 $59,245,187 
Apportionment  Ratio 0.21 0.09 
Value of LGA/LUS 29.5% 5.9% 
Value of PGA/PUS 28.2% 6.3% 
Value of SGA/SUS 14.1% 11.2% 
Source: Author’s calculation from Georgia Department of Revenue (2005). 
 
 
 
 Georgia property or payroll relative to receipts are the firms 
experiencing the greatest benefit from the switch to the 
single-factor formula.  Those firms which have only a little 
property or payroll presence in Georgia, as captured by their 
low apportionment rates, are those with an increase in their 
apportionment ratios.   
For example, consider a firm domiciled in Alabama with no 
property or payroll in Georgia but gross receipts from sales 
to customers in Georgia.7  Under a double-weighted three-
factor apportionment formula, this firm has an apportionment 
ratio equal to 0.5*(SGA/SUS).8  Under the single-factor 
apportionment formula the firm’s apportionment ratio 
increases to 1.0*(SGA/SUS).  According to our classification 
system, this firm would be categorized as a losing firm.  On 
the other hand, a firm with substantial property and payroll 
associated with Georgia, such as firms domiciled in Georgia, 
would move from an apportionment ratio represented by 
equation 1 to a ratio represented by equation 2.  The 
direction of change is not immediately apparent and will vary 
between firms.  For a typical firm domiciled in Georgia, the 
ratio of (LGA/LUS) and (PGA/PUS) are much greater in value than 
for firms not domiciled in Georgia.  Therefore, their 
apportionment ratio computed under the double-weighted 
three-factor formula is in many cases higher than the ratio 
computed under the single-factor formula, even with the 
higher weight placed on sales.  This is seen in Table 3 by 
focusing on the relative values of the property, compensation, 
and sales ratios.  Winning firms have much higher values of 
property and payroll relative to the losing firms but values of 
receipts that are similar.  Thus, these firms benefit from the 
switch to a single-factor formula because the reduction in the 
apportionment ratio associated with the elimination of the 
property or payroll ratios is greater than the increase in the 
apportionment ratio due to the higher weight on gross 
receipts.   
In many states, this type of apportionment change has been 
undertaken in the name of economic development, as 
discussed earlier.  To determine how the formula change 
affected domestic firms, we classify the winning and losing 
firms by their domestic/foreign status.  As shown in Table 4, 
58 percent of Georgia apportioning firms and 32 percent of 
non-Georgia based firms affected by the apportionment 
formula change are predicted to benefit from the switch to a 
single-factor formula in the sense that their apportionment 
ratios decline in value.9  19 percent of Georgia firms 
experience an increase in their apportionment ratio based on 
our simulations, compared to 52 percent of firms 
incorporated outside of Georgia.   
 
 
Revenue Consequences 
As stated earlier, our criteria for determining winning and losing 
firms is based on the change in a firm’s apportionment ratio as 
opposed to their tax liability.  Not all firms that experience a 
reduction in their apportionment ratio see a reduction in their tax 
liability, nor do all firms that experience an increase in their 
apportionment ratio see an increase in their tax liability.  In fact, 
based on results from these simulations, 49 percent of all firms 
with a decrease in their apportionment ratio see no change in 
their tax liability.  This is because these firms have negative 
taxable income and hence a zero tax liability under either the 
three-factor or single-factor apportionment formula.  This is 
usually the result of a large negative value for federal taxable 
income.  On average, firms with a decrease in their 
apportionment ratio see a tax savings of $18,238 and firms that 
see an increase in their apportionment ratio are predicted to 
experience a tax increase of $7,684, as shown in Table 5.  Overall 
the net revenue loss is estimated to be $74 million.   
It is important to note that this analysis does not take into 
account any change in behavior by the firm as a result of the 
change in the apportionment formula.  The anticipated behavioral 
changes could work in two directions.  First, firms may reallocate 
the location of their sales nationally and in Georgia in response to 
the apportionment formula change in a manner that will at least 
mitigate the increase in tax liability within Georgia.  Edmiston and 
Arze (2002) consider the effect of the 1995 switch from an 
equally-weighted three-factor formula to a double-weighted sales 
formula on the national and state allocation of sales of firms 
operating in Georgia.  The authors found that firms operating in 
Georgia lowered their levels of sales in Georgia by 9 percent in 
response to the switch in apportionment formulas.  This potential 
behavioral response serves to increase the revenue loss to the 
state.   
The second anticipated behavioral change is an increase in 
employment creating an increase in income tax revenues of some 
amount.  This behavioral effect works to reduce the revenue loss 
associated with the apportionment formula change.  Edmiston 
(2003) estimated that moving from a double-weighted sales 
formula to a single-factor formula increases multistate corporate 
payroll in Georgia by about $200 to $400 million over a three-
year period after the formula switch.  Since these effects work in 
opposite directions, it is not possible to determine the overall 
revenue effect inclusive of these behaviors to the state of Georgia.  
In addition, the increase in employment may lead to the increased 
use of job tax credits by firms which can also serve to reduce 
their corporate tax liability. 
 
  
TABLE 4. FIRMS AFFECTED BY APPORTIONMENT CHANGE BY DOMICILE STATUS 
 
Apportioning Firms Only 
 
Apportionment Ratio Reduction 
Apportionment Ratio 
Increase 
Georgia Firms 58% 19% 
Non-Georgia Firms 32% 52% 
Source: Author’s calculation from Georgia Department of Revenue (2005). Totals do not add because some firms 
experienced no change in their apportionment ratio. 
 
 
TABLE 5. REVENUE CONSEQUENCES OF APPORTIONMENT CHANGE 
 
Apportioning Firms Only 
Firms w/ an Apportionment 
Ratio Reduction 
Firms w/ an Apportionment 
Ratio Increase 
Average Change in Tax Liability -$18,238 $7,684 
% with No Change in Tax Liability 49% 42% 
Sum of Tax Liability Change -$174,241,802 $100,078,065 
 
2005 Net Revenue Effect (No 
behavioral effect) 
 
-$74,163,737 
Source: Author’s calculation from Georgia Department of Revenue (2005). 
 
 
TABLE 6. REVENUE CONSEQUENCES OF APPORTIONMENT CHANGE BY STATE OF INCORPORATION 
 
Apportioning Firms Only 
Firms w/ an Apportionment 
Ratio Reduction 
Firms w/ an Apportionment 
Ratio Increase 
Average Tax Effect of Georgia 
corporate filers 
 
-$25,664  
 
$4,380  
Total revenue effect of Georgia 
Corporate filers 
 
$-52,969,826 
 
$2,991,710 
Average Tax Effect of Non-Georgia 
corporate filers  
 
-$16,191 
 
$7,867  
Total revenue effect of Non-Georgia 
corporate filers 
 
$-121,271,976 
 
$97,086,355 
Source: Author’s calculation from Georgia Department of Revenue (2005). 
 
 
TABLE 7. AVERAGE CHANGE IN TAX LIABILITY BY NET WORTH  
 
 
Apportioning Firms Only  
Firms w/ an 
apportionment ratio 
reduction 
Firms w/ an 
apportionment ratio 
increase 
Georgia Net worth<$0 -$7,592  $3,076  
Georgia Net worth=$0 -$4,166  $3,812  
$0< Georgia Net Worth≤$1,000 -$1,255  $53  
$1,000< Georgia Net Worth≤$100,000 -$1,213  $405  
$100,000< Georgia Net Worth≤$1,000,000 -$4,061  $2,108  
$1,000,000< Georgia Net Worth -$56,531  $26,310  
Source: Author’s calculation from Georgia Department of Revenue (2005). 
 
 
 
 Table 6 shows that the winning Georgia firms are predicted by 
the simulations to experience an average tax savings of 
$25,664 and the losing Georgia firms are expected to 
experience an average tax increase of $4,380.  Total predicted 
gains to Georgia firms are estimated to be $53 million and 
losses are estimated to be $3 million.  Non-Georgia firms 
benefitting from the change are estimated to incur an average 
tax savings of $16,191, while non-Georgia firms harmed by the 
change in the apportionment formula are predicted to have an 
increase in their average tax liability of $7,867.  Total gains and 
losses for non-Georgia firms exceed those of Georgia firms 
because there are more non-Georgia firms.    
Table 7 provides the average tax liability increase and 
decrease by the net worth of the firms.  For both the winning 
and losing firms, the greatest activity is concentrated among 
firms at the highest level of the net worth distribution.  
Winning firms with assets in excess of $1,000,000 account for 
27 percent of all winning firms but account for 82 percent of 
all tax savings, with an average tax savings of $56,531 per firm.  
Losing firms face a similar, though not as dramatic distribution 
of tax increase.  Firms in the top asset category constitute 24 
percent of all firms that are harmed by the formula change but 
bear 84 percent of the increase in tax liability, with an average 
tax increase of $26,310 for firms with net worth in excess of 
$1,000,000. 
Conclusion 
This brief explores the characteristics of firms likely to benefit 
and lose from the switch to a single-factor apportionment 
formula.  As expected, we find that firms with large 
investments in property and large payroll expenses relative to 
sales within the state are those that benefit from the change.  
While our results show that there are more firms harmed by 
the switch, their aggregate increase in tax liability is less than 
the aggregate decrease for the firms that benefit.  Thus, the 
switch to a single-factor formula results in a net revenue loss 
to the state.  In addition, we find that in terms of Georgia 
firms, the gains to the winners far exceed the losses to the 
losing firms.  The difference between gains and losses is not as 
great for the non-Georgia firms.  Lastly, we find that the 
greatest gains and losses are associated with firms for which 
net worth exceeds $1 million.   
Notes 
1.  There are several additions and subtractions that are 
required to bring a firm’s federal base in line with the state 
base.  For instance, firms are required to add back the value of 
the federal deduction for bonus depreciation when computing 
their state tax base. 
 
 
 
2.  Corporations owe state corporate tax in each state in which 
they have nexus.  The rules for establishing nexus vary by state.  
Based on Georgia tax regulations, under certain conditions firms 
may still have nexus in Georgia even if they have no payroll or 
property within the state. 
 
3.  Because of a lack of uniformity between state corporate tax 
rules, the sum of the state tax bases may be greater than, equal 
to, or less than the firm’s federal tax base.   
 
4.  See Oakland (1992) for a more complete discussion. 
 
5.  The 2005 returns are the most recent data available to the 
Fiscal Research Center at the time of this research.   
 
6.  According to the Georgia revenue code, firms reporting a zero 
value for national payroll and property were subject to a 100 
percent weight on their sales in Georgia for purposes of 
determining that portion of the firm’s multistate income that is 
subject to Georgia corporate income tax.  This was a special rule 
applying only to these firms and was in place before the 2006-
2008 transition to a single-factor formula for all firms.  
 
7.  Because of the manner in which the apportionment factors are 
defined, under some circumstances a firm can have only receipts 
in Georgia and still meet the nexus requirement to file a 
corporate return.  This situation is not representative of the 
norm but the simplicity is useful for this example. 
 
8.  In this example, it is assumed that the firm has property and 
payroll expenses in Alabama.  
  
9.  These percentage values exclude firms that do not apportion 
and apportioning firms that are not affected by the change in the 
apportionment formula. 
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taxes as a percentage of personal income, reliance on taxes (as compared 
to fees, grants, etc) for revenue, and the changing balance between 
income taxes, sales taxes, and other taxes, and other trends.  (December 
2009) 
 
Current Charges and Miscellaneous General Revenue:  A Comparative. Analysis 
of Georgia and Selected States.  This report examines Georgia's current 
charges and miscellaneous general revenue compared to the AAA bond 
rated states, the Southeastern neighbor states and the U.S. average for 
fiscal years 2007 and 1992. (December 2009). 
 
Comparing Georgia's Fiscal Policies to Regional and National Peers.  This 
report analyzes the major components of Georgia's state and local 
revenue and expenditure mixes relative to its peer states. (December 
2009) 
 
Recent Changes in State and Local Funding for Education in Georgia. This 
report examines how the 2001 recession affected K-12 education 
spending in Georgia school systems. (September 2009) 
 
Household Income Inequality in Georgia, 1980 – 2007. This brief explores 
the change in the distribution of income.  (September 2009) 
 
Household Tax Burden Effects from Replacing Ad Valorem Taxes with 
Additional Sales Tax Levies. This brief estimates net tax effects across 
income classes from a sales tax for property tax swap; where Georgia 
property taxes are reduced and state sales taxes increased.  (August 
2009) 
 
An Examination of the Financial Health of Georgia’s Start-Up Charter Schools.  
This report examines the financial health of start-up charter schools in 
Georgia during the 2006-07 school year.  (July 2009) 
 
Corporate Tax Revenue Buoyancy.  This brief analyzes the growth pattern of 
the Georgia corporate income tax over time and the factors that have 
influenced this growth.  (July 2009) 
 
Forecasting the Recession and State Revenue Effects.  This brief presents 
information regarding the degree to which macroeconomic forecasters 
anticipated the timing and magnitude of the present recession and 
whether the significant decline in state revenues that has resulted might 
have been better anticipated.  (June 2009) 
 
Georgia’s Brain Gain.  This brief investigates trends in the interstate 
migration of young college graduates.  (March 2009) 
 
The Value of Homestead Exemptions in Georgia.  This brief estimates the 
total property tax savings, state-wide, to homeowners arising from 
homestead exemptions:  examples and descriptions are provided.  (March 
2009) 
 
Comparison of Georgia’s Tobacco and Alcoholic Beverage Excise Tax Rates.  
This brief provides a detailed comparison of excise tax rates across 
the United States.  (March 2009) 
 
Buoyancy of Georgia’s Sales and Use Tax.  This brief explores the 
growth in sales tax revenue relative to the growth of the state’s 
economy.  (March 2009) 
 
Buoyancy of Georgia’s Personal Income Tax.  This brief analyzes the 
growth in Georgia’s Income Tax and explores reasons for trends 
over time.  (March 2009) 
 
Growth and Local Government Spending in Georgia.  This report is a 
technical analysis that estimates the effect of local government 
spending on economic growth at the county level in Georgia.  
(February 2009) 
 
Georgia Revenues and Expenditures:  An Analysis of Their Geographic 
Distribution.  This report presents a geographic analysis of “who bears 
the burden” of state taxes and who benefits from state public 
expenditures.  (February 2009) 
 
Trends in Georgia Highway Funding, Urban Congestion, and Transit 
Utilization.  This report examines transportation funding, as well as 
urban congestion and transit utilization in Georgia as well as six 
other states for fiscal years 2000 and 2005.  (October 2008) 
 
Options for Funding Trauma Care in Georgia.  This report examines 
several options for funding trauma care in Georgia through dedicated 
revenue sources, with the objective of raising approximately $100 
million.  (October 2008) 
 
Distribution of the Georgia Corporate and Net Worth Tax Liabilities, 1998 
and 2005.  This brief illustrates the distribution of corporate and net 
worth income tax liabilities among Georgia corporations.  
(September 2008) 
 
The Effect of Insurance Premium Taxes on Employment. This report 
provides estimates of the effect of the insurance premium taxes on 
state-level employment in the insurance industry.  (September 2008) 
 
Variation in Teacher Salaries in Georgia.  This report documents the 
variation in K-12 public school teacher salaries in Georgia and 
discusses the causes of variation in teacher salaries within and across 
districts.  (August 2008) 
 
A Brief History of the Property Tax in Georgia.  This report is a 
chronology of the development of the property tax system that 
currently exists in Georgia from the 1852 legislation pointing out 
significant changes made over the past 156 years.  (August 2008) 
 
Estimates of the Effects on Property Tax Expansion Under Assessment 
Caps Proposed in HR 1246.  This report estimates the effect of 
assessment caps proposed in HB 1246 on county, school district, and 
city tax base growth.  (July 2008) 
 
By the Numbers:  Property Taxes in Georgia. This report presents data 
on the property tax in Georgia, considering the growth in property 
tax base and property tax revenue, how the tax base varies by 
county, changes over time, and property taxes by type of 
government.  (June 2008) 
 
Property Tax Limitations.  This report discusses property tax 
limitations in the U.S. and highlights limitations imposed in Georgia.  
(June 2008) 
 
An Analysis of a Need-Based Student Aid Program for Georgia.  This 
report explores issues associated with establishing a need-based 
student aid program in Georgia.  (May 2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
A Closer Look at Georgia’s Veteran Population.  This brief compares 
demographic information on Georgia's veteran population with that of 
the rest of the country.  (May 2008) 
 
Tracking the Economy of the City of Atlanta:  Past Trends and Future Prospects.  
This report explores the changes in the level and composition of 
employment in the City of Atlanta over the last 25 years.  (May 2008) 
 
Georgia’s Immigrants:  Past, Present, and Future.  This report examines the 
economic success of immigrants relative to the state’s residents as a 
whole and speculates on how we might expect immigrant populations to 
fare in the future.  (April 2008) 
 
Property Tax in Georgia.  This report discusses the structure of the 
property tax in Georgia and various provisions that make up the 
structure of the property tax.  (March 2008) 
 
A Targeted Property Tax Relief Program for Georgia.  This report describes 
how a targeted property tax relief program could be designed and 
provides estimates of the cost and distribution of program benefits.  
(February 2008) 
 
A Historical Comparison of Neighboring States with Different Income Tax 
Regimes.  This report focuses on simple historical differences between 
states without an income tax and neighbor states with an income tax.  
(November 2007) 
 
Replacing All Property Taxes:  An Analysis of Revenue Issues. This brief 
discusses the amount of revenue needed to replace all property taxes in 
Georgia.  (October 2007) 
 
Revenue Estimates for Eliminating Sales Tax Exemptions and Adding Services to 
the Sales Tax Base. This report provides revenue estimates for alternative 
combination of eliminating sales tax exemptions and adding services to 
the sales tax base.  (October 2007) 
 
Report on the City of South Fulton:  Potential Revenue and Expenditures 
(Revised). This report evaluates the fiscal consequences of incorporating a 
new city of South Fulton, using Fulton County revenue and expenditure 
data and benchmarks from other Georgia cities.  (October 2007) 
 
Report on the City of Chattahoochee Hill Country:  Potential Revenues and 
Expenditures. Using Fulton County revenue and expenditure data and 
benchmarks developed from other Georgia city data, this report 
evaluates the fiscal consequences of incorporating a new city of 
Chattahoochee Hill Country.  (October 2007) 
 
Selected Fiscal and Economic Implications of Aging. This report considers 
pressures and potential benefits of an increased elderly population in 
Georgia.  (October 2007) 
 
Subnational Value-Added Taxes:  Options for Georgia. This report considers 
the implications of levying a subnational value-added tax in Georgia as a 
replacement for the state corporate income and sales tax.  (September 
2007) 
 
Distribution of State and Local Government Revenue by Source.  This report 
compares the reliance on various revenue sources across Georgia 
compared with eight other states.  (September 2007) 
 
Tax Revenue Stability of Replacing the Property Tax with a Sales Tax. This 
policy brief discusses the implications for tax revenue stability of 
proposals that would replace the property tax with an increased sales 
tax.  (September 2007) 
 
 
 
For a free copy of any of the publications listed, call the Fiscal Research 
Center at 404/413-0249, or fax us at 404/413-0248.  All reports are 
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